In March 2022, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India did something unusual. It admitted — in writing, in a formal order — that the Resolution Professional appointed to manage my company, Su-Kam Power Systems, had violated the law. Charged pre-CIRP costs to the company. Appointed his own firm as advisor. Billed ₹4 crore in professional fees while collecting ₹12.58 lakh as his own fee. Ran a process riddled with conflicts of interest.

A year later, in June 2023, the IBBI issued a second order — this time against the Liquidator, Mr. Raj Kumar Ralhan. Found guilty of incurring unreasonable liquidation costs and failing to disclose professional appointments. His process advisors were paid ₹61.54 lakh while he earned ₹5.54 lakh. The advisors took more than 90% of the total fees.

Two separate IBBI orders. Two insolvency professionals found guilty. Both penalised. And the common thread running through both? PwC.

The RP, Mr. Rajiv Chakraborty — a PwC partner. The Liquidator, Mr. Raj Kumar Ralhan — also from PwC. The process advisors who billed crores during both the CIRP and liquidation? PwC LLP and PwC Private Limited. The same firm, at every stage, in every role, billing the dying company for the privilege of being destroyed.

My company — a ₹600 crore revenue business that employed over 2,000 people and pioneered solar energy in India — was sold for ₹10 crore. The IBBI found both officers guilty. And what did I get? Nothing. Absolutely nothing.

This is the story of how India’s insolvency system punishes its own officers — and still leaves the entrepreneur with nothing.

I Walked Into COC Meetings Expecting a Rescue. I Found a Courtroom.

When the CIRP began, I thought the process would focus on saving the company. I had built Su-Kam from scratch — I knew every product line, every dealer network, every factory floor. I assumed the Committee of Creditors would want to understand the business. How it worked. What could be revived. What the real value was.

Instead, I walked into COC meetings where they only talked about expenses and legal proceedings. They asked me questions about the past — about old transactions, old decisions, old numbers. Not once did anyone ask: how does this company actually function? What are the products? Who are the customers? What would it take to keep this running?

It was very disturbing. The COC, the Liquidator, the RP — they didn’t think the entrepreneur was important. They became judges unto themselves. Above the board. Above accountability. They had the power to decide the fate of 2,000 jobs and a ₹600 crore company, and they used that power to interrogate me about the past while the present burned.

I stopped attending. What was the point? Nobody was interested in the company. They were interested in the carcass.

The PwC Takeover: How One Firm Controlled Every Stage of My Company’s Destruction

What I didn’t fully understand at the time — but what two separate IBBI disciplinary orders would later confirm — was the extent to which a single firm had captured the entire insolvency process of Su-Kam Power Systems.

Here is how it worked:

The Resolution Professional — Mr. Rajiv Chakraborty — was a partner at PwC LLP. He was appointed as IRP by the NCLT on 5th April 2018 and later confirmed as RP. He then appointed PwC LLP and PwC Private Limited as process advisors to assist in the CIRP. His own firms. Billing the company he was supposed to protect.

When the company moved to liquidation on 3rd April 2019, the Liquidator appointed was Mr. Raj Kumar Ralhan — also from PwC. And what did Ralhan do? He continued the same PwC firms as process advisors during the liquidation. The COC approved it in the 13th COC meeting. The same pack, the same billing, the same capture — just a new phase.

During CIRP: PwC firms billed ₹3,99,80,545 (nearly ₹4 crore) while the RP earned ₹12,58,000. The advisors earned 30 times the RP’s fee.

During Liquidation: PwC firms billed ₹61.54 lakh while the Liquidator earned ₹5.54 lakh. The advisors took more than 90% of total fees.

Combined PwC billing across CIRP and Liquidation: over ₹4.6 crore.

Both the RP and the Liquidator were from PwC. Both appointed PwC as advisors. Both were found guilty by the IBBI. This wasn’t a fox guarding the henhouse — this was the entire pack moving in.

What the IBBI Found: Order by Order

Order 1: Against RP Rajiv Chakraborty (IBBI/DC/85/2022, 31 March 2022)

Conflict of Interest: Chakraborty was a partner at PwC LLP and appointed PwC LLP and PwC Pvt Ltd as professionals — his own firms. Violated Sections 20(2)(a) and 25(2)(d) of the IBC.
Abdication of Duty: SBI — the financial creditor that filed the case — appointed these professionals, not the RP. The bank that triggered the insolvency was choosing who would manage it.
Unreasonable Fees: PwC firms paid ₹3,99,80,545 — 30x the RP’s own fee. All charged to the corporate debtor.
Pre-CIRP Costs: ₹14,57,193 paid to SAM (SBI’s legal counsel for filing the case) were charged to Su-Kam as CIRP costs — expenses incurred before insolvency even began.
Duplicate Billing: Overlapping scope of work between PwC LLP, PwC Pvt Ltd, SAM, and Kirtane & Pandit. Same Section 29A due diligence billed multiple times.

Penalty: Return ₹14,57,193. One-year suspension from new assignments. Signed by Dr. Mukulita Vijayawargiya, Whole Time Member, IBBI. (Full order PDF)

Order 2: Against Liquidator Raj Kumar Ralhan (IBBI/DC/178/2023, 13 June 2023)

Excessive Liquidation Costs: PwC advisors paid ₹61.54 lakh vs Liquidator’s fee of ₹5.54 lakh. Over 90% of total fees went to the process advisors. The IBBI noted that since the CD was not a going concern during liquidation, the Liquidator should have reviewed the need for two process advisors and their fees.
Non-Disclosure of Professionals: Failed to disclose appointments of Firmex International Ltd and Securus Records Management Pvt Ltd to the Insolvency Professional Agency. Also failed to provide appointment details for Advocate Puneet Singh Bindra. The IBBI rejected his claim that these were “operational service providers” — the agreement itself used the term “professional services.”
Delayed Progress Reports: First progress report filed 126 days late. Second filed 93 days late. Ralhan blamed non-cooperation, employee unrest, and ERP access issues — but the IBBI noted that PwC, the same advisors from CIRP, were already in place, so the “no proper handover” defence was not tenable.

Penalty: Ralhan had already surrendered his Authorisation for Assignment (AFA). The IBBI directed that any fresh application for IP registration be kept in abeyance for two years. Signed by Sudhaker Shukla, Whole Time Member, IBBI. (Full order on CaseMine)

The Penalties That Insulted the Injury

Let me put the penalties side by side with the damage:

RP Penalty: Return ₹14.57 lakh + 1-year suspension
Liquidator Penalty: 2-year abeyance on new registration

PwC total billing: Over ₹4.6 crore
Company valuation: ₹300 crore
Company sold for: ₹10 crore
Jobs destroyed: 2,000+
Revenue lost: ₹600 crore annual

The RP’s penalty was 0.3% of what PwC billed. The Liquidator’s penalty was zero rupees.

If a shopkeeper steals from the cash register, he goes to jail. If two PwC professionals bleed a ₹600 crore company dry through their own firm, one gets a year’s holiday and the other quietly surrenders his licence.

Nobody Tells You Your Rights. That Is by Design.

Here is what nobody talks about: when your company enters CIRP, nobody from the IBC comes and tells you what your rights are. There are no guidelines. No handover protocol. No orientation. No document that says — here is what the RP can do, here is what the COC can do, here is what you can challenge, here is how you protect your interests.

You are suddenly an outsider in your own company. You have advocates and courts, but no one from the insolvency ecosystem reaches out to explain the aim of the process or how it is supposed to work. You are left to figure it out while your company is being dismantled.

Just making a law does not serve the purpose. How do you reach the affected parties? How do you control these RPs and Liquidators unless the entrepreneur is helped? The IBC created a framework for insolvency — but it forgot to create a framework for fairness.

The RP and Liquidator operate with almost unchecked power during the process. They decide who gets hired. They decide what gets spent. They decide what information the entrepreneur gets. And the COC — dominated by the very banks that filed the case — rubber-stamps everything. The entrepreneur is not even a spectator. He is treated as a suspect in the destruction of his own company.

Justice Was Served. To Everyone Except Me.

Both IBBI orders vindicated me. Every complaint I filed was found to be correct. The conflicts of interest, the PwC capture, the inflated fees, the pre-CIRP charges, the unreasonable liquidation costs, the non-disclosures — all confirmed. In a rational system, this would have led to consequences. Real consequences. The process would be questioned. The sale might be revisited. Compensation would be considered.

But the IBC doesn’t work that way. The wrong committed by the RP and Liquidator stays committed. The ₹300 crore company sold for ₹10 crore — that sale stands. The ₹4.6 crore billed by PwC — it stays with PwC. The 2,000 jobs lost — they stay lost. The entrepreneur’s life destroyed — that remains destroyed.

The IBBI can punish its officers, but it cannot undo their damage. There is no mechanism in the IBC for the entrepreneur to be made whole. No compensation. No reversal. No remedy. The law punishes — after the fact, mildly, symbolically — but it does not heal.

What Needs to Change

The IBC was designed to rescue companies. But it has become a system that rescues creditors — partially — while destroying entrepreneurs completely. Here is what must change:

1. Conflict of Interest Rules Must Have Teeth. If an RP comes from a firm, no one else from that firm should be allowed anywhere near the same case — not as liquidator, not as advisor, not as consultant. The current disclosure requirements are clearly insufficient, as both IBBI orders proved.
2. Penalties Must Match the Damage. A 6-month suspension for someone who helped dismantle a ₹600 crore company is not a penalty — it is a paid vacation. Penalties should include disgorgement of fees, financial compensation to affected stakeholders, and proportionate bars from practice. Research by ibclaw.in has documented how current penalties fail to deter misconduct.
3. Entrepreneurs Must Have Standing. In the current IBC framework, the promoter is treated as a suspect — someone to be investigated under Section 29A, not someone to be heard. The entrepreneur who built the company, who knows its value, who has the most to lose — has no formal standing in the process. This must change.
4. There Must Be a Remedy for the Promoter. When an IBBI order confirms misconduct by the RP or Liquidator, the affected promoter should have a right to seek compensation. The Delhi High Court has already started questioning some of these issues. But we need a statutory mechanism — not just judicial sympathy.
Su-Kam Power Systems Campus

Su-Kam Power Systems — A ₹600 crore company that pioneered solar energy in India, sold for ₹10 crore under IBC liquidation.


This is Part 6 of The IBC Files: An Entrepreneur’s Perspective — an 8-part series documenting what happens when India’s insolvency law meets the reality of entrepreneurship. Read the full series on kunwersachdev.com.

References & Sources

1. IBBI Disciplinary Order IBBI/DC/85/2022 against RP Rajiv Chakraborty (PDF)
2. IBBI Disciplinary Order IBBI/DC/178/2023 against Liquidator Raj Kumar Ralhan (CaseMine)
3. IIIPICAI Digest of Disciplinary Cases — Entry #31 (PDF)
4. IBC Section 29A — India Code
5. ibclaw.in Research
6. Kunwer Sachdev v IDBI Bank — Delhi High Court (LiveLaw)
7. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — India Code

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